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Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective 
Makes a Difference 
 




The old antagonism between the Quinean and the Duhemian view on underdetermination is 
reexamined. In this respect, two theses will be defended. First, it is argued that the main differences 
between Quine‘s and Duhem‘s versions of underdetermination derive from a different attitude 
towards the history of science. While Quine considered underdetermination from an ahistorical, a 
logical point of view, Duhem approached it as a distinguished historian of physics. On this basis, a 
logical and a historical version of the underdetermination thesis can be distinguished. The second 
thesis of the article is that the main objections against underdetermination are fatal only to the 




It is revealing to compare W.V.O. Quine‘s ―Two dogmas of empiricism‖, the locus classicus for his 
underdetermination thesis, with the relevant passages about underdetermination in Pierre Duhem‘s 
―The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory‖. While Duhem‘s book is filled with examples from the 
history of physics, in Quine‘s text historical references are almost completely lacking. While 
Duhem, the acclaimed historian of physics, was practising philosophy of science from a genuinely 
historical perspective, Quine approached underdetermination from an ahistorical, a logical point of 
view.  
 In Section Two, it will be argued that the respective attitudes towards the history of science 
lie at the origin of the most important differences between these two main versions of the 
underdetermination thesis. Also, the stance on history can serve as a guideline for detecting further 
differences. All this allows us to refer to Quine‘s perspective as the logical rendering and to 
Duhem‘s as the historical rendering of underdetermination. 
 In Section Three, we evaluate both versions of underdetermination with respect to the main 
objections that have been brought forward in the literature. Remarkably, they turn out fatal only to 
the logical rendering. This argument in defence of the historical version of underdetermination 
provides further justification for the recent interest in transient underdetermination, largely due to 
the significant and insightful work of Kyle Stanford (2001, 2006, 2009). As Stanford readily 
acknowledges, transient underdetermination owes much to a Duhemian spirit (2006, Ch. 2) and 
therefore to the historical rendering of underdetermination. 
 In the last Section we conclude with some positive remarks about the role of 
underdetermination in the scientific enterprise. Essentially, Duhem‘s version of the 
underdetermination thesis is a necessary and indispensable tool for the historical reconstruction of 
science and it is an epistemic reminder that science should be pluralistic and always tolerant 
towards alternative approaches. Much in the spirit of Carrier (2009), a shift in focus is advocated 
away from seeing underdetermination principally as an argument in the realism-antirealism debate 
towards examining the significance of underdetermination for scientific method. 
 
 
2. The logical and the historical view on underdetermination 
Quine once claimed that Duhem never endorsed underdetermination at all (1975, 313). In a literal 
sense, this is correct given that Quine defines underdetermination with respect to all possible 
evidence while Duhem always considers evidential situations in an actual historical context. 
However, from a larger perspective Quine‘s insistence is profoundly misleading. Quine crucially 
overlooks that the underdetermination thesis constitutes a closely-knit web with other Duhemian 
ideas, especially the theory-ladenness of observation, confirmational holism, and the impossibility 
of an experimentum crucis—if underdetermination is understood simply in the sense that theory is 
not uniquely determined by evidence. In this formulation, which will be used from here on, the 
underdetermination thesis is compatible with both Duhem‘s and Quine‘s views. Still, there are 
notable differences, to which we will turn now. 
 Several scholars have compared Quine‘s and Duhem‘s rendering of the underdetermination 
thesis (Vuillemin 1978, Ariew 1984, Quine 1986, Gillies 1993)
1
. But all these authors fail to come 
up with a general rationale driving the different viewpoints of Duhem and Quine. In this section the 
claim will be defended that all the main differences between Duhem‘s and Quine‘s versions of 
underdetermination derive from their respective stance towards the history of science. Quine 
approaches underdetermination from an ahistorical, a logical point of view. His ‗in-principle‘ 
viewpoint determines only the boundaries that pure deductive logic imposes on scientific 
theorizing. Such logical restrictions fall short of providing a sufficient basis for Duhem‘s interest in 
reconstructing episodes from the history of physics. 
 The key difference noted and agreed upon by all scholars is that Duhem imposes careful 
limitations on the underdetermination thesis while Quine refrains from doing so by stating claims 
that are all largely tenable only ―in legalistic principle‖ (Quine 1986, 619). In more detail, such 
limitations include (Gillies 1993, 313-314): (i) Duhem restricts underdetermination to a specific 
type of statements, namely theoretical statements in abstract sciences like physics
2
. Quine denies 
any such distinction framing his discussion in an outright denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction 
per se. (ii) Relatedly, the scope of the thesis is specified differently by Duhem and Quine. Quine 
thought it to concern the whole of science, from logic and mathematics to the almost purely 
phenomenological sciences. By contrast, Duhem claims that phenomenological sciences like 
physiology are not affected by the ambiguities of underdetermination. (iii) Duhem makes reference 
to ‗good sense‘ as an aid complementary to deductive logic, which will (at least in most cases) tell 
the physicist which theory to choose. Quine‘s account includes nothing of this sort.  
 It is quite obvious, why someone interested in the reconstruction of the history of physics 
cannot work with Quine‘s over-generalizations and in-principle statements. Of course, there is some 
legalistic truth to Quine‘s denial of the analytic-synthetic distinction, i.e. to his claim that all 
statements inseparably contain an analytic linguistic and a synthetic empirical component. But the 
working scientist and the historian of science have to assume a much more pragmatic attitude. If a 
scientific theory is to be useful, a distinction between ‗pure‘ observation statements (e.g. ‗The 
needle of my measuring device points to 10.‘), abstract hypotheses in advanced theories and fully 
analytic statements like the principles of deductive logic is essential. 
 More often than not, we find general agreement from a practical point of view on the 
analytic or synthetic nature of a scientific proposition. Historians and working scientists just have to 
accept such unanimity in the overwhelming majority of cases. However, in a certain transition 
region, the synthetic and analytic parts are indeed very hard to disentangle, for example when 
dealing with central hypotheses in abstract sciences. When we delve into the history of science, this 
transition region is often fiercely embattled lacking the consensus that we described above. E.g. if 
we look at fundamental axioms in physical theories, these cannot be purely analytic statements, 
since they clearly tell us something about the world. But they cannot be purely synthetic either, 
since universal validity cannot be based on experience alone. It is primarily in this transition region 
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 Not all these sources list differences between Duhem‘s and Quine‘s versions of underdetermination, some only 
compare Duhem and Quine with respect to their holism. But since the concepts of underdetermination and holism 
are intricately connected, such differences immediately apply to the underdetermination thesis as well. Among these 
authors, Veuillemin is the only one to notice that Duhem renders underdetermination as a historical thesis with 
Quine being ―as indifferent as Americans often are concerning history‖ (Vuillemin 1978, 598). However, Veuillemin 
also misses the overall importance of this difference in perspective. 
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 Duhem has been largely misunderstood in his alleged restriction of underdetermination to physics. Plausibly, Duhem 
considered himself an expert only in the methodology of physics and thus did not dare to judge the possible 
extension of these ideas to other sciences: ―But if it is good to notice the analogies between our diverse scientific 
methods, it is on condition that we do not forget the differences separating them.‖ (Duhem 1990, 187) 
between the synthetic and the analytic, where Duhem‘s interconnected theses about theory-
ladenness of observation, holism, impossibility of an experimentum crucis and underdetermination 
become relevant. 
 Relatedly, neither the historian of science nor the working scientist will insist on the 
interconnectedness of all knowledge in the way Quine stresses it. For Quine, ―[t]he totality of our 
so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric 
which impinges on experience only along the edges‖ (Quine 1951, 42). For Quine, 
underdetermination will never concern only clearly delineated areas of scientific knowledge but will 
always affect the whole of science. By contrast, Duhem limits the scope of underdetermination to 
the net of hypotheses that make up the core of abstract theories. For the working scientist as well as 
for the historian of science, Quine‘s viewpoint is untenable. Surely, hypotheses within physics can 
be discussed without considering physiology, genetics, or the trivial problems troubling our 
everyday life. Fortunately, a particle physicist carrying out experiments at CERN need not be aware 
of the fact that you are reading this article now. Of course, Quine is right that in principle all 
knowledge is connected through logic and mathematics. In extreme situations unexpected 
connections might even become relevant, but in general Quine‘s extreme holism will make any 
scientific endeavour impossible. If underdetermination is to play a role for scientific method, then 
only on the level of clearly delineated groups of hypotheses within abstract scientific theories. 
 Finally, once the historian of science accepts the possibility of underdetermination, she 
needs an account of ‗good sense‘ to make sense of historical episodes where scientists eventually 
settled on one of the rivalling accounts in spite of the in-principle impossibility of an experimentum 
crucis. Essentially, a historian who accepts underdetermination faces the choice between two 
options: either the decision-making of the scientists was fully irrational and therefore determined 
largely by social factors or the decision-making relied on norms and rules that fall short of being 
fully rational while nevertheless being better justified than purely subjective arbitrariness. It is the 
second option that Duhem chooses with his theory of good sense: ―But these reasons of good sense 
do not impose themselves with the same implacable rigor that the prescriptions of logic do. There is 
something vague and uncertain about them; they do not reveal themselves with the same degree of 
clarity to all minds.‖ (Duhem 1906/1954, 217) Duhem‘s theory of good sense and his nuanced 
account of scientific method show the sensibility of a distinguished historian to the diversity of 
influences shaping scientific evolution, in stark contrast to the coarseness of Quine‘s approach 
which comes close to denying any distinction that cannot be drawn with absolute logical rigour as 
well as any norms or rules that do not satisfy the strict rationality criteria of logical thinking.
3
 
 Once it has become clear, that the different stance on the history of science lies at the origin 
of the differences between Duhem‘s and Quine‘s versions of underdetermination, this insight can 
serve as a guiding principle to detect further distinctions. Remarkably, this principle reveals a 
number of further crucial differences, which have not been mentioned in any of the references cited 
at the beginning of this section. 
 (iv) Duhem (1906/1954) discusses underdetermination in relation to the evidence in an 
actual historical situation, while Quine (1975) relates underdetermination to all possible evidence. 
The focus shifts from actually observed events to events that are observable in principle. Obviously, 
a historian of science or a working scientist will always address a scientific problem in the context 
of a specific historical situation. Only the logician has the privilege to abstract from the historical 
context with respect to evidence and enter the realm of possible evidence. To the working scientist, 
the idea of possible evidence is largely meaningless. In addition, even if agreement between two 
theories with respect to all possible evidence could be established, this would immediately render 
the case uninteresting for the working scientist. Arguably, a working scientist is much more 
interested in theories that largely agree with respect to the available evidence but delineate different 
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  Quine admits to some pragmatic criteria for theory choice, for example that statements in the periphery are less 
costly to change than those pertaining to the centre of the web of knowledge. But these occasional remarks fall far 
short of the sophistication of Duhem‘s account. 
research agendas by making different predictions. 
 (v) Relatedly, when dealing with actual episodes of underdetermination from the history of 
science, rival theories generally fail to be fully equivalent even with respect to past evidence. While 
having a large overlap, the domains of application will be somewhat different. Also, the competing 
accounts will deviate from each other in the reconstruction of available evidence, both in numbers 
and exactness. A good way of thinking about such rival theories is that they are potentially 
equivalent, i.e. with sufficient ingenuity they can generally be made to agree with each other. In 
summary, actual cases of underdetermination concern competing accounts, where different 
ontologies provide the starting point for different future research programs. A situation of 
underdetermination does not require complete empirical equivalence, not even with regard to past 
evidence. Rather, underdetermination arises in the moment, when a choice between both 
frameworks cannot be made by relying on the usual criteria of empirical adequacy and of epistemic 
virtues. 
 (vi) The ahistorical nature of Quine‘s rendering of underdetermination is well illustrated by 
his choice of examples. They are mostly constructed from contemporary theories or even from non-
scientific parts of knowledge, while Duhem searches the history of science for relevant episodes. 
Quine, the logician and linguist, starts an unfortunate chain of constructed and algorithmic 
examples involving for example redefinition of terms, reformulation of logic, hallucinations and the 
like (1951, 36, 42-46). Much confusion has resulted from not properly distinguishing examples of 
the historical kind from the logical kind, for example when actual historical episodes like the 
underdetermination of matrix and wave mechanics are discussed in terms of empirical equivalence. 
This insight also points us to a possible explanation for the alleged lack of examples for 
underdetermination in the history, which has often been cited by opponents of the 
underdetermination thesis (e.g. Norton 2008, 25). If you search the history of science with empirical 
equivalence in mind, you will certainly miss the most pertinent examples of underdetermination 
like the episode from electrodynamics that will be presented in the next section. 
 (vii) Last not least, there is a difference in aim. While Quine‘s version of the thesis has 
mostly found its place as an argument in linguistic debates concerning the analytic-synthetic 
distinction (1951) or the indeterminacy of translation (1970) as well as in the realism/antirealism 
debate, Duhem‘s version with its historical outlook is an important tool both for the historian and 
the working scientist. Duhem‘s version finds its place naturally in scientific method. If we want 
underdetermination to be relevant to the mature sciences like physics, chemistry or biology, then we 
have no other choice but to accept Duhem‘s viewpoint. 
 
 
3. Defending the historical version of underdetermination 
In this section we will argue that the main criticisms of the underdetermination thesis are fatal only 
to the logical version of the thesis. The two most important arguments against underdetermination 
respectively counter the two principal strategies that have been employed in defence of 
underdetermination. First, the identical rivals objection counters what John Norton calls the 
inductive argument for underdetermination, which relies on citing examples (2008, 24). Second, the 
objection from an impoverished account of confirmation attempts to undermine the holistic 
argument for underdetermination. Let us discuss these in turn.  
 Following the inductive strategy, a proponent of underdetermination should ideally produce 
a long list of poignant examples showing that underdetermination is a persistent phenomenon in 
scientific development. By contrast, opponents of underdetermination could engage in a piece-meal 
attack showing that each of these examples is either trivial, misconstrued, or for other reasons 
invalid. Space is too limited here to address any of the debates concerning specific historical 
episodes in detail. Let us just remark that sometimes historical examples are supposedly refuted on 
the basis that the theories were not really empirically equivalent. It should be clear by now that this 
mixes up the logical and the historical versions of underdetermination. 
 There exist also general strategies against the inductive justification of underdetermination. 
The most important one has been called the identical rivals objection, which argues that alleged 
examples of underdetermination always concern only variant formulations of the same theory 
(Quine 1975, Magnus 2003, Norton 2008, Frost-Arnold and Magnus 2009). A clever version was 
proposed by John Norton, who in an ingenious single sweep attempts to invalidate a large class of 
examples: „The very fact that observational equivalence can be demonstrated by arguments brief 
enough to be included in a journal article means that we cannot preclude the possibility that the 
theories are merely variant formulations of the same theory.― (2008, 17)  
 Clearly, this objection concerns only the Quinean type of constructed examples, for which a 
short algorithm can be given within the scope of a journal article—involving redefinitions of terms, 
hallucinations, Cartesian demons, brains in the vat etc. The Duhemian ones, naturally grown in the 
history of science, remain unrefuted. Duhem‘s examples are those that were developed over large 
periods of time and by a considerable number of scientists. In these cases, any equivalence-proof is 
an immensely intricate affair, never to be accomplished in a single journal article. Too often, 
philosophers arguing for underdetermination have given in to the temptation to present clear-cut 
algorithmic examples rather than engaging in detailed historical studies (Quine 1951, Kukla 1996). 
Stanford has rightly pointed out that this strategy is self-defeating and has called it a ―devil‘s 
bargain‖ (Stanford 2001): „In retrospect, perhaps it should not surprise us that philosophers‘ 
algorithms cannot make short work of the daunting task of generating alternative hypotheses that 
are both scientifically serious and genuinely distinct from existing competitors, for this is precisely 
the sort of difficult conceptual achievement that demands the sustained efforts of real scientists over 
years, decades, and even careers.― (Stanford 2006, 15) True examples of underdetermination can 
only come from the history of science, in rare exceptions also from contemporary science. 
 Let me draw your attention to an excellent example of underdetermination from the history 
of electrodynamics, which has not been mentioned at all in the recent literature—at least to my 
knowledge. In the second half of the 19
th
 century, there was agreement among some leading figures, 
including James Clerk Maxwell and William Thomson, that the relation between the continental 
action-at-a-distance approach and the British field theoretic approach constitutes a situation of 
underdetermination (for more details cf. Pietsch 2010). Maxwell writes: ―[I]t is exceedingly 
important that two methods should be compared, both of which have succeeded in explaining the 
principal electromagnetic phenomena, and both of which have attempted to explain the propagation 
of light as an electromagnetic phenomenon, and have actually calculated its velocity, while at the 
same time the fundamental conceptions of what actually takes place, as well as most of the 
secondary conceptions of the quantities concerned, are radically different.‖ (Maxwell 1873, x) This 
is an exemplary assessment of a situation of historical underdetermination in one of the most 
prominent places of Maxwell‘s work, the introduction to the Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism. 
 It is immediately obvious that we are not dealing with identical rivals here since both 
programs are worlds apart in terms of ontology and methodology. Also, both of them have 
contributed crucially to the development of electrodynamics. Furthermore, while the two programs 
can certainly be connected via elaborate bridge laws there does not exist any straightforward 
algorithm that turns one theory into the other. 
 In this context we can address another objection that has been voiced in connection with 
underdetermination, which might be called the objection from scientific import. What if anything, 
so a working scientist could ask, does science gain from observationally equivalent theories? Why 
not take the simplest approach and forget about the others? Well granted, the constructed examples 
are largely uninteresting for science and scientific methodology. But the historical examples are not 
observationally equivalent in the abstract algorithmic way of logical underdetermination. Rather, 
the rivalling theories in historical underdetermination provide the researchers with widely different 
perspectives on the world. Only in retrospect, theories can often be made to fit all data. But this 
does not imply any strict equivalence from the outset. Once you try to press actual ‗living‘ science 
in a logical corset, much is lost. 
 A proponent of logical underdetermination might object that underdetermination is about 
theories that rely on different metaphysics in terms of ontology, mathematical structure, etc. while 
being nevertheless observationally equivalent. The reply of the proponent of the historical view 
would point out that this misconstrues the role of metaphysics in science. The metaphysical 
foundations of a theory are never independent of the empirical research to be undertaken. 
Metaphysics offers a necessary and indispensable guideline for the inductive business of science: 
which experiments to do, which theoretical problems to tackle next. Underdetermination is really 
about equally strong theories with different metaphysics, that provide the scientist with different 
instructions what to do next and what to expect from nature. 
 Let us quickly illustrate this by means of the mentioned example from electrodynamics. The 
field view populates the world with a wholly different ontology in comparison with the particles of 
the action-at-a-distance view. These different ontologies provide a completely different perspective 
on the world whose influence can be traced in the different merits of the theories. In short, while the 
focus in the field view is on the space in between, the focus in action at a distance is on matter 
interacting across a distance. For example, the action-at-a-distance paradigm has historically 
contributed to electrodynamics the formulation of the fundamental laws of electro- and 
magnetostatics modelled on Newtonian action at a distance (Coulomb), and the unification of 
electrostatic and electrodynamic interaction (Weber). On the other hand, the field view has 
contributed the theories of dielectrics and diamagnetism, i.e. of electromagnetic media (Faraday), 
and the unification of optics and electrodynamics (Maxwell). 
 This perspective dissolves another objection against underdetermination, which was raised 
by Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin. According to them, any assessment of ―empirical equivalence is 
both contextual and defeasible‖ (1991, 454). This correct remark casts again much doubt on the 
logical formulation of underdetermination with its insistence on logical equivalence. By contrast, 
the remark only underscores the historical view on underdetermination with its focus on potential 
equivalence—a notion which is historically relative and also depends on the willingness and 
ingenuity of the protagonists to make different frameworks fit the data. 
 Let us finally address the second major objection against underdetermination mentioned at 
the beginning of this section. It attacks the holistic argument for underdetermination. According to 
this maybe most common objection, the underdetermination thesis relies on an impoverished 
account of confirmation
4
. And indeed, both Duhem and Quine largely employ a hypothetico-
deductive methodology to argue for underdetermination, largely ignoring the wide variety of 
inductive methods.
5
 In short, their argument goes as follows. Because in every experimental test of 
abstract hypotheses a plethora of auxiliary hypotheses must be employed, no observation can ever 
falsify a specific abstract hypothesis. In principle then, we can always stick to certain abstract 
hypotheses, no matter what the evidence is. Therefore different scientists, who stick to mutually 
contradictory ontological hypotheses, can never be proven wrong in principle. There is little doubt 
that this argument for underdetermination with its emphasis on falsification relies crucially on a 
hypothetico-deductive framework. Opponents of underdetermination then claim, that the argument 
fails to work if we add inductive methods.
6
 Sometimes (but not too often) a detailed analysis is 
provided for this claim and it is shown how specific inductive techniques actually resolve cases of 
underdetermination (e.g. in Norton 2008, 29-32). Given the limited scope of this paper, we have to 
leave a reply to these arguments for another occasion. 
 Fortunately from the historical perspective, we need not counter any of these specific claims. 
While it is indeed plausible that the constructed and algorithmic examples can be invalidated by 
means of inductive methods, this is obviously not true for the historical examples. Every reproach, 
that an impoverished scientific method was used in these situations, would immediately carry over 
to the respective scientists themselves. In the example from electrodynamics, the charge would 
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 An excellent overview and introduction to this objection can be found in (Norton 2008, 26-32). 
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 Duhem does include a thorough critique of inductive methods (1906/1954, Part II Ch. VI). 
6
 Some have equated Duhemian ‗good sense‘ with inductive methods. But Duhem explicitly insisted on good sense 
not being rationally reconstructible (cp. the quote in Section Two). When Duhem claims that good sense often 
resolves episodes of underdetermination, this is decidedly not equivalent with claiming that induction solves the 
problem. 
immediately be referred to Maxwell and Thomson. It is clearly absurd to claim, that these men, who 
are among the best physicists in the history of science, relied on an impoverished methodology for 
physics. 
 So far, we have examined a variety of objections against underdetermination and have found 
that while several are indeed fatal to Quine‘s logical version they generally fail even to be relevant 
to Duhem‘s version. The simple reason is that the majority of them rely on the doubtful concept of 
empirical or observational equivalence with respect to possible evidence. However, there is another 
objection which undermines the holistic argument for underdetermination and which is indeed 
relevant to the historical view on underdetermination. It seems to have been first formulated by 
Grünbaum: „Duhem cannot guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O 
[empirical findings] from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of H [empirical hypothesis] 
and some revised non-trivial version R of A [auxiliary assumptions].― (1960, 75) Granted, but this 
asks too much from Duhem, anyhow. There are never any logical guarantees for the existence of 
scientific theories. In the end, we are faced with a stalemate between the opponent and the 
proponent of underdetermination since the non-existence of alternatives cannot be logically proven 
either. Maybe then, we should give underdetermination the benefit of the doubt. After all, if it 




Two claims were defended in this article. First, all differences between the Quinean and the 
Duhemian rendering of underdetermination can be made plausible from a difference in perspective: 
Duhem from a historical, Quine from a logical point of view. Second, the neglect of the historical 
perspective has been detrimental: The fatal objections against underdetermination concern only the 
Quinean rendering. Much remains to be done. In particular, we need to have a detailed look at 
specific examples of underdetermination from the history of science. Also, further research is 
necessary on the exact methodological implications of underdetermination in the abstract sciences. 
Whatever the results of these studies may be, Duhem‘s rendering is useful as a tool for 
understanding the historical development of science and stands as an epistemological reminder that 
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